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Abstract 
All ages deal with the debate between reform and revolution in the contexts of their 
distinctive challenges, problems, and prospects. While reflecting on today’s socio-
political realities in the U.S., this paper identifies a theoretical stagnancy in academia 
that deters any radical praxis for revolution. Addressing some key theoretical stances 
within the reform/revolution dyad, the paper argues that any criticism of “revolution in 
a linear future” is no easy approval for “reform in a static present” either. Also, 
replacing the “apocalyptic future” with the “here and now” of the progressive present 
is perhaps inadequate without critically reflecting on the “quality” of the “present”. 
This paper does not recommend any specific prescriptive means but outlines a 
speculative prospect of “here and now” for revolution. It critiques theoretical stances 
of a number of postcolonial and poststructuralist thinkers and argues that these 
stances eventually get appropriated within the hegemonic reform-based justice 
underpinning neoliberalism. It argues that using the work of Henry Lefebvre, David 
Harvey, and Doreen Massey, a spatiotemporal dialectic for revolution can be 
developed which in turn also embraces revolutionary visions of Alain Badiou. The 
paper explains how this dialectic reveals an inadequacy in the politics of reform and 
adjustment within theories of James C Scott, Michel de Certeau, Homi K Bhabha, 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. It shows how liberal justice discourses that 
routinely promote reform in an attempt to misguide revolutionary potentials manage to 
find a comfort zone in the politics of difference. Specifically, the paper invests in the 




'Change Life!' 'Change Society!'-these precepts mean nothing without the production of an 
appropriate space." 
~ Henry Lefebvre in The Production of Space 
 
Why is it that when we get impatient with the tyranny of a socio-political system, we usually 
imagine revolution in a distant future?  We do so because our political imagination maintains a 
linear spatiotemporal sequence: reform now, revolution later. Queering the reform/revolution 
dyad would require queering this linearity and, thereby, questioning the normalcy of our static 
political imagination. In this paper, I question such normalcies and argue for a spatiotemporal 
dialectic of reform/revolution as an alternative way of understanding the relations between them. 
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Such queering is required today to radicalize our political imagination. This is what Henry 
Lefebvre suggests when he, as in the epigraph above, argues that without production of 
appropriate space, changes to society would mean nothing. Similarly, for Alison Kafer, 
radicalizing political imagination means not deferring the chance of revolution endlessly, 
because doing so inexorably ushers in “stagnation and acquiescence, an inability to move in any 
direction because of a permanently forward-looking gaze.”1 What we require instead is a 
dialectic between present and future, between our “now” and our “later”. This dialectic is 
required in order to create an ‘appropriate space’ for revolution.  This paper attempts to reflect 
on some possible means of producing this ‘appropriate space’. It also critiques academia’s 
involvement in making our political imagination static.  
To begin with, it is helpful to contextualize the reform/revolution dyad in our static 
imagination. In other words, how we have been made to pursue reform as an alternative to 
revolution can be tracked in understanding the operation of authoritative forces across the socio-
historical formation of different forms of power: sovereign power, disciplinary power, biopower, 
and necropower. Sovereign power is the power of the emperor. It is the absolute power having 
right over life and death of the subjects. It gets exerted directly on bodies through corporeal 
punishment. Thus, sovereign power is punitive and vengeful. The Medieval period, the age of 
monarchy, was the heyday of sovereign power. Later, because of gradually changing power 
relations in society, sovereign power started to lose its efficacy. Michel Foucault, in Discipline 
and Punish, marks the eighteenth century as a transitional phase, a phase in which sovereignty 
gets overlaid with a new form of power what Foucault calls disciplinary power. This power also 
keeps targeting the body but through different means. As a modern form of power, it establishes 
control more with rational means rather than with brutal force. Within this modern form of 
power an individual “is [not] amputated, repressed, altered by our social order … [but] is 
carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of force and bodies (1991:217), as 
Foucault explains. Disciplinary power is productive, not punitive like sovereign power. It is 
productive in the sense that it produces docile subjects, not by oppressing bodies physically, but 
in and through establishing techniques or conditions within which subjects ‘take birth’ or come 
into play.  
In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, this disciplinary power again gets 
overlain, this time with "biopower”. Foucault defines biopower as non-disciplinary technology as 
it gets “applied not to man-as-body but to the living man …to man-as-species (2003:242).” 
Biopower starts controlling larger groups of people with regularization of “the birth rate, the 
mortality rate, longevity and so on (2003: 243).” Biopower controls subjects in applying 
particular forms of reason such as “forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures (2003: 
246).”  
To explain how biopower works, Achille Mbembe, in his essay “Necropolitics”, explains the 
relations among freedom, politics, and agency, as he argues 
 
[I]t is on the basis of a distinction between reason  and unreason (passion, 
fantasy) that late-modern criticism has been able to articulate a certain idea of the 
political, the community, the subject— or, more fundamentally, of what a good 
life is all about, how to achieve it, and, in the process, to become a fully moral 
agent (Mbembe:13).  
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Mbembe thus marks the technique of biopower, which, for him, is a control through interplay 
of reason and unreason. Later, he questions if the same technique should be referred to when we 
inquire the conditions within which warfare, drone attack, massive killing, and so on get 
performed today. Mbembe states that a choice between life and death, not the interplay of reason 
and unreason, is what has occupied the center stage within a new configuration of politics, 
communities, and subjects. It is not the promise of the good life any longer which sets terms for 
the exertion of power, but  physical death, social death, and the threat of death on which the 
latest form of power operates. Mbembe calls this "necropower".  
The reform/revolution dyad through the ages of sovereign power, biopower and necropower 
has accordingly gone through different paradigm shifts. First, let us consider what we might call 
reform/revolution 1.0. In this model, reform means changes within an ongoing system so that the 
system in question can be fixed to establish the principle of social justice. Revolution, on the 
other hand, is throwing away, destroying, or abolishing the system itself to replace it with a new 
one. What motivates revolutionary zeal is passion for social justice infused with a new vision of 
equality for all. This model was at work in the French Revolution, in the American Revolution, 
and in the decolonization of the global South after World War II.  
But this understanding of the reform/revolution, especially the notion of activists’ agency in 
the pursuit of their passion for justice and equality, needs to be contextualized within the socio-
economic reconfigurations after World War II. With the onset of the neoliberal capitalist 
aggression, consent of the people gets increasingly “hijacked” instead of being simply 
“manufactured” by nation-states, which in turn start working as components of the machine 
called “Empire”2.  Later, since the 1990s, with the intensification of neoliberal manipulation 
through biopower, and since the 2000s, through its supplementary force, necropower, the consent 
of the people gets neither “manufactured” nor “hijacked” but starts being celebrated  as “always 
already taken” or as “bankrupted.”  
This bankruptcy of the people's consent reconstitutes political imagination as disciplined, 
domesticated and non-transgressional. Individuals and groups increasingly seek justice within 
rights-based frames. All they seek  is protection and legal fixes from states while keeping intact 
the core structures of injustice: racism, sexism, ableism, patriarchy, capitalism, islamophobia, 
trans phobia, and so on. While the Civil Rights Movement sought justice within a biopolitical 
conditioning, i.e. “the promise of a better life”, rights-based movements in the post 9/11-world 
carefully follow the logic of the necropolitical, the necessity of being protected from social death 
and physical death. Instead of integrational movements incorporating HIV activists, prison 
activists, LGBT activists, trans activists, black radicals, ecojustice activists, homeless activists, 
and so on, all we witness is a pattern of parallel and separate movements. The necropolitical 
risk—police brutality, imprisonment, death and so on—in organizing radical social movements, 
the necessity to cash out activists’ efforts in short-term goals while endlessly deferring the “non-
achievable” ones, the efficacy of identity politics, a form of quick organizing among 
homogenous interest groups while not transcending boundaries of race, class, sex, gender, and so 
on, are some recent trends that blur the radical vision in the Civil Rights Movement, a vision for 
ceaseless united struggle until true equality gets established. Worse, the mainstream LGBT 
movement in the US claims affinity with the Civil Rights Movement, but the mainstream LGBT 
movement takes the Civil Rights Movement as an end point of the struggle for equality across 
racial lines. Also, those involved in the LGBT movement organize themselves while ‘crowding 
out’  black people, using the Civil Rights Movement as an analog for their own movement while 
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continuing to organize in and through anti-blackness.  Regarding the  civil rights analogy, Jared 
Sexton, for example, points out:  
 
The metaphoric transfer that dismisses the legitimacy of black struggles 
against racial slavery (and …its ‘functional surrogates’) while it appropriates 
black suffering as the template for nonblack grievances remain one of the defining 
features of contemporary political culture    (Sexton: 42).  
 
The separate and parallel movements sometimes compete against each other to get closer to 
the sovereign in an attempt to victimize others who do not belong to any given interest group. 
Sarah Lamble, for example, shows how a partnership between the mainstream LGBT 
communities and the police criminalize the immigrants and the Muslims in the UK and the US. 
She terms this as ‘queer investments in punishment’3.  
This trend of disintegration finds some comfort zone in the popular fetishizing of the politics 
of difference in academia.  How academia, in the last four decades, has participated in this 
bankruptcy of consent and disintegration of social movements and how we can recover from this 
constitute two key concerns of this paper.  The incorporation of academia within the neoliberal 
capitalist project is often criticized as the project of the Military-Industrial-Academic-Complex 
(Chomsky, 1997; Robin, 2003; Giroux 2007). What Henry Giroux wrote about his time at Penn 
State is still true about all universities: “[…] faculties were becoming irrelevant as an 
oppositional force. Many disappeared into discourses that threatened no one, some simply were 
too scared to raise critical issues in their classrooms for fear of being fired, and many simply no 
longer had the conviction to uphold the university as a democratic public sphere” (as cited  in 
Hedges, 2009, p.  91). Giroux in the same interview was talking mainly about changes in the 
universities especially after the demise of the World Trade Center. However, in general, the 
Military-Industrial-Academic-Complex since the 1990s has gone through a paradigm shift from 
the Cold War economy to the neoliberal capitalist one. The shift is not just from one of the bi-
polar world politics to that of the unipolar, it is more about intensification of biopower and 
necropower to discipline people while managing an uninterrupted flow of capital across spaces 
within the global capitalist economy. Though numerous scholars, critics, and intellectuals like 
Henry Giroux, Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein and others have already marked the incorporation 
of academia in both phases, an inside story of the participation of academia to the increasing de-
radicalization of political imagination remains long overdue.  
I argue that one of the ways this de-radicalization occurs is in and through the production and 
dissemination of certain theories that provide frames to define, influence and shape all possible 
discourses, including those of activism and politics. In the era of interdisciplinarity in academia, 
we are going through the best of times and the worst of times: the neoliberal and biopolitical 
fascism in the name of "democracy" (?) have been more severe than ever but at the same time, 
we witness numerous uprisings and protests against this across the world. In this conjuncture, 
people finding new hope for revolution must reshape the role of academia so that a much 
required radical praxis for revolution can at last emerge.  
First, it is important to understand how an increasing number of academic scholars, 
researchers and authors promote certain views of power and counter-power which recommend 
ceaseless adaptation to and compromise with the hegemonic systems in the form of micropolitics 
and identity politics. This is how academia deters radical politics or transformative changes. In 
this paper, I will present a case study to show how established concepts of power and counter-
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power within academia are inadequate to bring transformative changes. Also, I will foreground 
spatiotemporal dialectics as one of the means towards revolution.  
 
Section II: Influential concepts of power and counter-power in academia 
In the age of post-everything theories, academia has moved from structural to poststructural 
discourses of power and counter-power. Instead of articulating any systematic and structured 
ways of mobilizing dissent, academia routinely foregrounds fragmented, partial, and sporadic 
attempts to combat power. Stigmatization of Marxist theories on the one hand, and the increasing 
fetishization of poststructuralism, on the other, has obviously inspired people to locate the 
operation of power and also the scope of resistance everywhere. I would argue that this 
everywhere eventually becomes nowhere since the logic of fragmented combat deprives people 
of any adequate forms of resistance. To offer a brief glimpse of the Foucauldian and Deleuzian 
concepts of power and counter-power within academia, I would state the following as established 
and common views:  
 
a. In an age of the intertwined complexities that emerge within global capitalism, it 
is futile to single out particular persons, agents, or even multinational companies for the 
miseries of the common people.  
b. People should locate and combat power in bits and pieces not because these 
would gradually constitute larger momentum but because this is the only way of 
combating manipulative forces, since any total resistance is conceptually futile. One way 
of combating power is using identity politics that demands rights within the existing 
system.  
 
Overall, academia has found it convenient to replace the “totalizing” view of power and 
counter power of Karl Marx, for example, with the differential view of Michel Foucault and 
Gilles Deleuze.  
 Though there is a difference between their views of power, both Foucault and Deleuze 
believe that power is embedded in all of our practices and social relations so intertwiningly that 
any particular nodal point of it is as significant as any other. Foucault, therefore, foregrounds 
microphysics of power and Deleuze argues for molecular vestibules of desire as liberating 
power. Both of them, however, promote micropolitics or fragmented resistance as means of 
counter-power (Buchanan, 2008). Foucault emphasizes an individual’s intersubjectivity as 
embodied reality within conflictual operations of power, between the societal domination and the 
individuals’ resistance in their attempts to claim power. Foucault believes that power operates at 
most micro levels of social relation and he calls this the microphysics of power. Individuals can 
be powerful as they attempt to “transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (1988: 18).” Micropolitics of power for 
individuals would be gaining the upper hand in the process of intersubjectivity.  Deleuze, on the 
other hand, considers counter-power or resistance as reactive and replaces it with affirmative 
configurations of desire—liberating libido, with the use of which individuals can escape fascism 
or repressive impulses. For Deleuze, desire itself is revolutionary in the sense the free-floating 
desire would transform both the molecular and the molar configurations of the society but it 
should always start with the molecular. Hence transformative changes at the level of the 
micropolitical should be given priority. James C. Scott, Michel de Certeau and Homi K Bhabha 
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also promote micropolitics in their respective projects. All forms of micropolitics, generally, 
recommend resistance in bits and pieces, a technique which does not confront larger structures of 
power, such as capitalism, imperialism, racism, patriarchy, et cetera. All forms of micropolitics 
fetishize the everyday struggle against the control of power.  
Locating micropolitics or infrapolitics in the theoretical legacy of counter-hegemonic 
struggle will open up a space for us to understand the nature and objective of micropolitics and 
also its relative strengths and weaknesses. James C. Scott  in his 1990-book Domination and the 
Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts introduced the idea of infrapolitics, an everyday form of 
resistance that falls short of openly declared contestations. Scott, attempts to foreground the 
superior-subordinate relations in which the subordinate appears to acquiesce willingly to the 
stated and unstated expectations of the dominant, and argues that the weak and oppressed of the 
society are not free to speak in the presence of power. These subordinate groups instead create a 
secret discourse,which Scott labels as “hidden script”,that represents a critique of power spoken 
behind the backs of the dominant.  .(A similar theory of everyday resistance is developed by 
Michel de Certeau in his 1988-book The Practice of Everyday Life. Certeau argues that the 
authority in and through some overpowering policies and actions—which he calls “strategies”—
tries to control individuals, who in turn apply tactics,  innovative actions to defy, evade, and 
critique, if not permanently overthrow,  that authority.  
In a similar vein, Homi K. Bhabha in his 1994-book The Location of Culture offers concepts 
like “sly civility” and “mimicry” as counter-colonial Certeauian tactics which are basically 
attempts to evade systemic appropriation by transgressing the colonizer/colonized binary. To 
define mimicry Bhabha (1994) writes:  
 
[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a 
subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that 
the discourse of mimicry is constructed around ambivalence; in order to be 
effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference 
(p.122).  
 
As Bhabha argues, colonial discourse wants the colonized to be extremely like the colonizer, 
but by no means identical. If there were an absolute equivalence between the two, then the 
ideologies justifying colonial rule would be unable to operate. The colonizer assumes that there 
is a structural non-equivalence, a split between superior and inferior which explains why any one 
group of people can dominate another at all. Bhabha intends to puncture the colonizers’ claim or 
assumption of superiority by relying on the slippage of meaning through which the colonized 
achieve their agency. This sounds revolutionary only at the expense of dispossessing most of the 
colonized people. That is, Bhabha reduces the social to the semiotic and remains lavishly 
indifferent to capitalistic management of differences. He may call for constant becoming but 
does not consider that people do not have equal capabilities to pursue this constant becoming. 
 In this paper, I use infrapolitics and micropolitics interchangeably. But it is helpful to 
keep in mind that there is a difference between them. This difference is situated in the different 
perspectives on power and counter-power:  
a) Infra means below or beyond a particular limit of anything. Infrapolitics refer to a 
change in the nature of politics: in their everyday negotiations with authoritative forces, 
subordinate groups increasingly move away from any direct conflict with structures of 
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power. So, instead of appearing as directly confrontational, infrapolitics appear as 
evasively subversive.  
b) Micropolitics is different from infrapolitics. Micropolitics refers to politics 
individuals would perform to attain power since power does not remain in any fixed 
center; it is embedded everywhere.   
In line with the above distinction, tactics are practical acts which constitute the performance 
of infrapolitics.  
 
Politics based on Power and Counter-Power: Micropolitics, Identity Politics and 
Coalitional Politics 
 
 The concepts of power and counter-power theorized by Foucault, Deleuze, Scott, 
Certeau, and Bhabha have gained the academic legitimacy to influence later scholars who 
recycle and reproduce these concepts to make the horizon of radical political imagination limited 
to the point of being ineffective. To exemplify the different modes of micropolitics offered by 
some of these later scholars, I will discuss two texts as part of a case study in order to  
understand concepts of power and counter-power celebrated and reinforced within academia. 
The texts are Racial Imperatives: Discipline, Performativity, and Struggles against Subjection 
(2012) by Nadine Ehlers and, Aloha America: Hula Circuits through the U.S. Empire (2012) by 
Adria L. Imada. There are other relevant texts, texts like Native Americans and the Christian 
Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances (2008) by Andrea Smith, which promote 
coalitional politics but which,—I would argue,—should also rather embrace the dialectic 
between micropolitics and macropolitics.  
Nadine Ehlers, in her book Racial Imperatives (2012), uses Michel Foucault’s theory of 
power and Judith Butler’s account of performativity to understand how individuals become 
‘raced’ subjects. Ehlers excavates the 1925 “racial fraud” case of Rhinelander V. Rhinelander. 
The case takes us to New York in the early twentieth century. A man named Leonard charged his 
wife Alice with fraud, accusing her of having lured him to wed her by concealing her colored 
identity. The jury, after going through the ritual of examining her body,which was stripped naked 
and paraded,gave the verdict in favor of Alice: she was unmistakably black. Leonard, in effect, 
was found to be “aberrant and deserving of legal and extra-legal reprimand” (3). For the jury, 
Leonard defied racial expectations, especially the imperative to maintain white racial purity. For 
Ehlers, both Leonard and Alice appear as subversive, as none of them cared to conform to the 
expectations of respective racial passing. Alice took shelter in a liminal space, in ambiguity, in 
an indeterminacy in which she is not conforming to the either/or kind of binary positioning along 
the racial line. By transgressing the border, she is affirming her positioning in a third space. She 
thus formulates a new potential for racial agency. Ehlers celebrates it as a transformative gesture. 
To make this claim convincing, Ehlers goes for a Foucauldian back up, this time in the theory 
of power. Foucault’s phenomenal claim that power has a capillary movement, that power does 
not have any center, and that it is moving and relational is emphasized by Ehlers (2012) 
rigorously,  and she follows this direction only to foreground another Foucauldian claim that 
power is not absolute and resistance is immanent in each relation of power:   
 
[p]recisely because power is not owned but exercised or deployed from 
multiple and contesting sites, and because of its contingency (it is reliant on 
bodies, locations, specific institutions, discursive avenues), the very exercise of 
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power always (and necessarily) produces unintended effects. That subjects are 
immanent within power networks, and transmit power, means that they can and 
do effect resistances that work to reverse, displace, contest, and revise the 
objectives of power (p.110).  
 
Excavating the potential for resistance from the Foucauldian archive, Ehlers (2012) connects 
it to Butler’s notion of the subject as a site of ambivalence as Butler argued that power at once 
acts on the subject and is acted by the subject:  
 
Formed in power, the subject enacts the requirement of power. It is these 
requirements that constitute the subject, but the reenactment of this power 
operates in such a way as to conceal the prior the working of power. The subject 
appears, then, as if they were the origin of power, for these are seen as the 
subject’s own power (p. 111).  
 
The next step, which is the cornerstone of the entire effort—to foreground Alice’s agency as 
revolutionary—is Butler’s claim that in the recitation or continuous repetition of the 
performative, the very potential of agency looms large: “[a]gency is to be found in the 
possibilities opened up in and by the constrained appropriation of the regulatory law, by the 
materialization of that law’’ (p.111).  
Here both Ehlers and Butler are investing in the Certeauian escape route of agency—which is 
also argued for by James Scott and Homi K Bhabha, in their respective projects, as they suggest 
appropriating the fissures, gaps and inconsistencies within the strategic control of any socio-
economic and political dominance called hegemony. Ehlers fails to notice that the biggest 
problem with Alice’s agency is that it segregates itself from the social or the collective. For one 
thing, how Alice’s agency will help people struggling against racism is missing in Ehlers’ 
project. Ehlers would have defended that this does not help resolve the structural crisis but this is 
decidedly individual resistance and hence a distinctive one. In fact, the cause of Ehlers’ short-
sightedness is her theoretical frame of individualistic infrapolitics and tactics. The negotiation 
with structures of power in this case is not directly confrontational; it is indirect, hidden, implicit, 
and evasive. So, it is helpful to critique the realm of the undeclared form of resistance. This 
realm is situated in more complex social realties than what Certeau implies. What Certeau marks 
as agency in the undeclared form of resistance is mere happenstance within a complex web of 
social realities in which the dominator/dominated dichotomy is not linear or one dimensional. 
Gramsci would have reminded Certeau that individuals in a social context can simultaneously 
occupy positions of domination and dominated in their different roles as husband or wife, worker 
or manager, rich or poor, white or non-white, et cetera, as Mittelman (212) argues: 
   
In this connection, Gramsci reminded us that subaltern identities are embedded in  
complex overlapping social networks in which individuals simultaneously assume  
positions of domination and subordination (perhaps as a husband or 
wife, an elder or junior, a manager or office clerk, and a donor or recipient 
of aid). 
 
Therefore, to address multiple configurations of power within complex social realities we 
live in, any project of resistance must engage with larger structures of power: racism, patriarchy, 
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capitalism, imperialism, and so on. Otherwise, it is not possible to imagine any interventional 
act, be it direct or hidden.  
To apply this Gramscian understanding to Ehlers’ project, Alice’s resistance can be 
interpreted in a different way from Ehlers’ intended reading. Alice wants to look  white, as she 
wants to transcend the racial binary. But her becoming  white, in her own terms, can be seen as 
transferring herself from the realm of the oppressed to the realm of the oppressor, again 
following the simplistic logic of Ehlers that mere transcending suggests agency. Alice’s agency 
in this reading, then, appears to be a betrayal. It is helpful to keep in mind that the judge did not 
find this brand of agency threatening at all; he rather finds that Leonard’s agency may dismantle 
the white texture of the society.  In this way, Gramsci’s observation regarding the flexible, 
unreliable, and simultaneous positioning of the oppressor/oppressed identity sets Ehlers’ project 
upside down.  
Similarly, Certeau himself is not ambitious enough to expect that his tactics would one day 
get transformed into common sense. But followers of Certeau such as Ehlers seem to believe that 
the trickledown effect of  tactics would help develop “the war of position” (Gramsci: 292) — 
social organization in and through cultural hegemony—as Gramsci would like to say. But they 
do not notice that no war of position is possible without any attempt to connect the individual 
with the social. In a sense, it can be argued that the individualistic tactic, in fact, derails political 
dissent by emptying out any potential for the war of position. Certeauvian tactic does so by 
occupying the imaginaries of the individuals with a problematic fantasy of cherishing the 
subversive mode as an end-in-itself.   
Adria L. Imada’s arguments for infrapolitics in her book Aloha America (2012) is not as 
circuitous as that of  Ehlers. Imada in her book introduces us to the hula performers who, 
between 1890s and 1960s, travel across the U.S to perform in theaters, commercial nightclubs, 
military bases and various other spaces. Their performances, as Imada argues, help construct a 
benign and feminine image of Hawaii. This representation in turn reinforces the colonizer-
colonized binary as mutually desired.  In this way, Imada shows how the hula circuits help 
develop an “imagined fantasy”, a powerful imaginary that enables Americans to possess Hawaii 
physically, erotically, and symbolically. Imada’s second objective  is showing how the touring 
hula performances in the US incorporate veiled critique of US expansionism into their 
performances. While exposing the nature of this critique performed by the hula circuit, Imada 
uses the infrapolitics of Scott and the tactic of Certeau as frames. 
The veiled critique of US imperialism accomplished by the hula circuit appears in many 
forms. One of them is “kaona”, a hidden meaning embedded in the poetry the hula girls recite 
that often serves a counter-colonial archive of collective Hawaiian memory, preserving pre-
conquest histories, epistemologies, and ontologies. Imada takes this hidden meaning or 'kaona' as 
reproduction of Scott’s “hidden scripts”.   But “kaona”, the hidden meaning, whether in poetry or 
performances, remains hidden, and unintelligible to the audience. In fact, it fails to transfer much 
dissent, if any, from the hula circuit performers to the larger community of people, especially the 
people who know nothing about the historical legacy of hula. As a result, the “kaona” remains  
encrypted in the event, and unintelligible beyond the special performers.  
In line with James Scott’s concept of “public script”, or Certeau’s “strategy”, Imada finds a 
number of ways of getting Hawaiian women interpellated into the structures of colonial 
aggression. Women’s bodily movements, for example, are made to provide a scopophilic 
pleasure to American audiences as they go on ascribing Hawaiians to a lower order of humanity. 
In effect, a kind of colonial script gets written on Hawaiian women and their bodies. Against 
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this, as Imada argues, the hula circuit unravels the “public script” by applying the tactics of 
“hidden script” in and through a number of counter-colonial activities. (In response to the public 
script that shows them as inferior and sexualized objects, the Hawaiian women assert “hula as a 
legitimate practice, and present themselves as modern Native women and cosmopolitan tourists” 
(Imada, p. 63). For me, this “hidden script” seems to be a romanticized and uncritical version of 
the channeling of the potential of dissent. Even though the hula preserves a rich tradition, none 
other than the hula girls care to know it. Worse, with their reception of modern American fashion 
and costume to, they are conforming to the taste of the imperialist against which their other 
counter-colonial tactics are aimed. This makes their counter-colonial stance  merely casual, mere 
happenstance. 
Imada finally claims that the hula girls “appropriate technologies such as studio photography 
and urban fashion for their own desires” (p. 64). In an attempt to counteract the sexualized 
representation of hula girls, they try to look decent, and dress elegantly.. Also, they offer counter 
gazes in studio photographs to deny their objectification. However, what they are doing can be 
seen as a particular way of carrying their persona off stage. Their counter gazes may make them 
rational humans which in turn falsify their colonized representation as sexualized and subhuman 
puppets. At any rate, this way of asserting agency has its own logic and value, but a very limited 
one, mainly because it tells one to find a little dignified space within the ongoing public script or 
strategy instead of offering any strong challenge to it. Both Ehlers and Imada, much like so 
many other scholars in academia, in this way, continue to glorify infrapolitics. In doing so, they 
uncritically infatuate postmodern inclination towards fragments and micro-narratives which, in 
the end, serves the interest of the neoliberal capitalist (mis)management within whose ambience 
the infrapolitics originate and thrive in the first place. 
 
Spatial Politics of Coalition Building 
 
 In contrast to fragmented resistance through either individualistic or mechanistically 
organized micropolitics, I also observe in strategies of resistance, attempts to form coalitions that 
transcend the horizontal categories: race, class, sex, gender, et cetera. Because of the urge to 
transcend, this, coalitional politics has radical potential. I will call it spatial infrapolitics, or 
spatial micropolitics. Spatial infrapolitics can be discussed with reference to two books: Spaces 
of Conflict, Sounds of Solidarity: Music, Race, and Spatial Entitlement in Los Angeles (2013) 
and Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances 
(2008). 
 In Spaces of Conflict, Sounds of Solidarity (2013), Gaye Theresa Johnson shows how 
infrapolitics can go beyond the sphere of the individual and how it can be communal, social, 
collective and participatory. “Although racism persisted, resistance always existed”, writes 
Johnson, as she foregrounds anti-racist and egalitarian cultural politics between African-
Americans and Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles.  She theorizes the infrapolitics practiced by 
the Black and Brown residents of Los Angeles as “spatial entitlement” and describes it as  
 
“… a way in which marginalized communities have created new collectivities 
based not just upon eviction and exclusion from physical places, but also new and 
imaginative use of technology, creativity, and spaces. In many instances 
overlooked by social historians, everyday reclamation of space, assertion of social 
Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum, Vol. 6, Issue 1  
11 
	  
citizenship, and infrapolitical struggle have created the conditions for future 
success, in organized and collective movements” (p. x).  (Italics supplied)  
 
Noticeably, spatial entitlement is unique in at least two ways. It prioritizes coalitional politics 
over fragmented politics.  It seeks for imaginative and creative ways of unlocking spaces as a 
critical response to multiple segregation, separation, and exclusion within physical places. In this 
sense, it does spatialize infrapolitics as it attempts to establish the tripartite dynamics of time, 
place, and social being, as suggested by Henry Lefebvre in The Production of Space.  In other 
words, spatial entitlement refers to collective struggles, not to any individualistic attempt to seize 
upon the cracks and fissures within a hegemonic condition, which latter is promoted by Certeau, 
Bhabha, and Scott.  
Apparently, Gaye Theresa Johnson aligns her spatial entitlement with the infrapolitics 
theorized by James Scott. But importantly, Scott, unlike Johnson, does not provide any futuristic 
possibility of infrapolitics. Scott simply zooms in on the sporadic attempts of counter resistance 
among farmers in a Malaysian village. Those attempts are inconsistent, and haphazard, though 
Scott would have argued that they are "spontaneous", hence, “natural” and, thereby, free from 
the romance of revolution, and that the authority—in the imagination of the farmers—is too 
powerful to fight against. I strongly criticize this approach of Scott and Certeau as they are 
limiting political imagination here. They accept the status quo as inevitable, intact, irreplaceable, 
and unchangeable. This is totally against the spirit of the material dialectic of Marx and Harvey, 
as I explain in the next section, and it leads us to another important difference between Scott and 
Johnson. Scott’s infrapolitics is bereft of any collectivity while Theresa Johnson mobilizes 
collective politics as a nucleus to reclamation of shared struggle among "the Blacks and the 
Browns". Against housing segregation in the ghettos, spatial entitlement creates new modes of 
coalition within a shared soundscape, as Johnson argues:  
 
“[t]hey did not have to be in each other’s physical presence to enjoy the same 
music at the same time as it was broadcast to them on radios in living rooms, 
bedrooms, neighborhood hangouts, and automobiles. These strategies and 
affinities speak to the power of popular music and of popular culture to envision 
and create new political possibilities” (p. xiii).  
 
 While Certeau, Bhabha, and Scott invest in fragmented politics, Johnson relies on 
coalitional politics. In today’s multicultural, multi ethno-racial condition of spaces across the 
world, spatial entitlement promises a futuristic politics that stands against multiple forms of 
manipulation. Johnson’s spatial entitlement “connects local articulations to international 
movements” (xii). I found “memory” as another important component in “spatial entitlement”. 
To show how memory helps collective organizing, Johnson emphasizes the history of African- 
Americans  in Mexico and the common struggle of Afro-mestizos. Infrapolitics here wants to 
transcend boundaries of one’s own community in order to connect other possible coalition 
building efforts. In this sense, spatial entitlement has much more potential for organizing a social 
movement. In brief, Scott, Certeau, Bhabha, and Johnson focus on the everyday form of 
resistance, but what makes Johnson stand out is her investment in the politics of space. She goes 
on to articulate the significance of creating everyday space by mobilizing coalition here and now 
and projecting spaces towards future as she argues: 
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Struggles for freedom and equality currently engaged by multiracial social 
justice movements emerge from the enduring historical relevance of Black-
Brown spatial struggles and coalitional politics. It is a past whose legacy has 
too much power to remain unacknowledged and unexamined, particularly as 
evidence of what cultural workers and community activists have already 
accomplished on the road to a just future (xxii).  
 
Johnson’s spatial entitlement thus relies on a legacy of struggle across ethno-racial 
boundaries to usher in a just future.  
In a similar vein, Andrea Smith, in her Native Americans and the Christian Right: The 
Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances (2008) emphasizes reframing issues for coalition 
building in an attempt to achieve support from unlikely allies. While Johnson shows likely 
alliances between racial minorities of black and brown folks, Smith emphasizes unlikely 
alliances in a recuperative move that seeks to work upon the stagnancy of political imagination, a 
stagnancy that situates Native Americans and Christian evangelicals as unlikely partners in the 
first place. It is often thought that Native Americans and white evangelicals would likely  pursue 
different goals in their respective and necessarily separate activism. The source of such belief 
resides in valuing the ease in organizing activists from the homogenous groups centering on a 
single vector of differences: either race or class, for example. But such ease in organizing may 
prevent us from achieving larger goals: instead of placing demands within rights-based frames, 
we must attempt the reconfiguration of structures of power that always dictate terms of rights, 
pacify dissent here and there, and appropriate forms of resistance that become threatening—all to 
maintain the status quo of any tyrannical system. Therefore, it becomes a radical move as Smith 
promotes coalitional politics and not identity politics. Smith shows how both the Native 
Americans and the Christian Right can foreground pragmatic collaboration. As an example, she 
explains how Native environmental activists can go beyond their own communities and find 
allies among white progressive ecojustice activists. Smith rightly marks the danger in such 
alliances, as white ecojustice activists may appropriate the agenda of the Native environmental 
activists. But she is also careful to debunk the myth of appropriation, a stalemate reinforcing 
boundary drawing activism in both communities. She does so by proving examples of an 
innovative tactic: re-centering Native concerns in the context of the Christian evangelicals.  As a 
case study, Smith shows how the coalition between the Christian Right and American Indians 
orchestrated a successful campaign across white and non-white communities. As a result,  Exxon 
and Rio Algom were compelled to stop mining in Wisconsin, which pollutes water bodies and 
forests, sources for fishing and hunting for  Native Americans.   
Thus, reframing separate activism while taking initiatives for coalition building is what 
Smith theorizes as the ‘politics of articulation’. She believes that mere representation of reality to 
outsiders and hope for support to arrive may reinforce a hegemonic condition instead of 
combating it. She thus emphasizes becoming an actor of social change. Based on the observation 
by Laclau and Mouffe, Smith argues: “our task is not to organize the revolution but to organize 
ourselves for the revolution; not to make the revolution but to take advantage of it” (xvii).  
Smith’s politics of rearticualtion depends on enthusiastic organizing of coalitions. Thus, it is 
different from Scott’s spontaneous or natural form of resistance in the Malaysian farmers. 
Compared with Smith’s project, Scott’s infrapolitics reinforces hegemony instead of combating 
it.  
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“Native people are thought to be hopelessly mired in identity politics, concerned only about 
cultural particularities (xi)”, Andrea Smith observes. She argues that going beyond the 
conventional and fossilized notion of allies and adversaries is important for all of us, partly 
because we can rightly identify ourselves as playthings in the hands of biopolitical power-blocks 
within the neoliberal capitalistic system of management of differences, and mainly because we 
want to mobilize emancipatory politics as resistance to hegemonic forces. Transcending the fixed 
boundaries between allies and adversaries can open up a new vista of micro-politics, as Smith 
emphatically reminds us: “[i]n doing so, we might open ourselves to unexpected strategic 
alliances with groups across the political spectrum that furthers our politically progressive goals 
(xi)”. Basically, Smith wants to reconceptualize identity politics as coalitional politics. Also, she 
wants to move towards a new politics that goes beyond the left- versus right-wing politics. Using 
“religious and political configurations of Christian Right and American Indian activism (xi-xii)”, 
Smith rethinks “the nature of political strategy and alliance building for progressive purposes” 
(xii).   
Thus, understanding the potential of spatial micropolitics confirms one thing: spatial 
micropolitics and macropolitics are not mutually exclusive but supplementary. Binary 
juxtaposition of them may create a “systemic vacuum” or intellectual blockade within which any 
initiation of resistance will be derided as inadequate. To prevent this intellectual blockade, it is 
important to recognize the radical potential of Johnson’s spatial entitlement and Smith’s politics 
of articulation as I have explained above. I will once again state that for Scott, Certeau, and 
Bhabha, infrapolitics is basically disconnected from any vestige of collectivity. For them, 
attempting to avoid the grip of any manipulative system is the only option left. Transforming the 
system is not the objective of their project.  As a result, their infrapolitics ignores not only 
Johnson’s memory and spatial entitlement but also Smith’s politics of articulation. Scott, 
Certeau, and Bhabha make infrapolitics solely individualistic. In a sense, their micropolitics is 
one step behind identity politics and two steps behind coalitional politics, vis-à-vis the emerging 
necessities of a new kind of infrapolitics in our time.  
 
III: Understanding Problems of Micropolitics:  Toward a Dialectical Praxis  
 
 The reform-revolution dyad in academia plays out in the binary formation and parallel 
juxtaposition of micropolitics and macropolitics. As I want to go beyond the longstanding 
reform-revolution dyad and argue for dialectic between micropolitics and macropolitics within 
all acts of resistance, it is important to locate a theoretical configuration of the proposed 
spatiotemporal dialectic. Also, it is important to respond to the following questions: What is 
spatiotemporal dialectic?  How is it different from Marxian and Hegelian dialectics? How does it 
help to conceptualize and advance the dialectic between micropolitics and macropolitics?  
Among the different developments of dialectical frameworks, I have found David Harvey’s 
spatiotemporal dialectic much helpful. An understanding of this particular dialectic shows why 
micropolitics, infrapolitics, and identity politics are inadequate to challenge the intertwined 
systems of injustice in a crisscrossed web of neoliberal global capitalism, biopower, racism, 
sexism, ableism, patriarchy, imperialism, and so on. Also, an understanding of the 
spatiotemporal dialectic advances the dialectic between micropolitical and macropolitical 
resistance.  
First, I will briefly compare the Marxian dialectic with the Hegelian dialectic. Then I will 
explain why I believe Harvey’s spatiotemporal dialectic can help us understand the problems in 
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infrapolitics, micropolitics, and identity politics. Marx was careful to explain the difference 
between the Hegelian dialectic, which is mystifying, idealistic, and metaphysical, and his version 
of dialectic, which is rational, historicist, and material. In his version of the dialectic, Marx 
rejects Hegel’s metaphysical essence of history. In the ‘Afterword’ to the second German edition 
of Capital, he replaces Hegel’s mystified form of dialectics with his own rational form. The 
rational dialectic “regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and 
therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it 
lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary”4.  
Marx, therefore, emphasizes the historicist and materialist character of social realities and 
denies their natural or absolute character. This is very significant, especially because this rational 
dialectic would reject the uncritical and popular acceptance of the present status quo within the 
neoliberal capitalist system as permanent, absolute and invincible. Also, it encourages a 
spatiotemporal understanding of  social phenomena. Because of this historicist and materialist 
aspect of Marx’s dialectic, however, I do not agree with David Harvey when Harvey finds an 
“indifference to space and time” in Marx’s rational dialectic (Harvey: 98). The historicist and 
materialist nature of Marxian dialectic does not have any conflict with the spatiotemporal 
dimensions Harvey attempts to develop. David Harvey, however, finds a privilege of time over 
space in Marxist dialectic as he argues:   
 
The insertion of spatial consideration into most forms of social theorizing 
(dialectical and nondialectical) often turns out to be profoundly disruptive of how  
theory can be specified and put to work. Social theories' metanarratives (such as 
those provided by Marx and Weber) usually concentrate on processes of temporal 
change, keeping spatiality constant (p. 9).   
 
Harvey’s allegation against Marx about his indifference to space does not much hold when 
we consider Marx’s critique of ‘abstract labor’5 in capitalist economy in which the traces of 
qualitatively different labor from different times and places are wiped out as part of an 
inevitable process of profit making. In a capitalist economy, labor is made to appear as 
‘abstract’ in the sense that  both the laborers’ ‘concrete’ or individual labor has only one value 
dimension, which is ‘use-value’, and their relationship to the products they produce are made 
disremembered or totally forgotten. Without this disremembering, no product can achieve 
‘exchange-value’ or value as a commodity. The hazardous working environment in which 
garment workers work in Bangladesh or Vietnam, for example, are an integral part of the 
laborers’ ‘concrete labor’. But such contextualization of space, and laborers’ risky working 
hours must be disregarded or shunted into oblivion in the profit making conditions capitalists 
must rely on. Thus, Marx’s distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete labor’ evidence his 
awareness of variables of time and space.  
Nevertheless, it is true—as Harvey confesses—that “Marx chose never to write out any 
principles of dialectics … the only way to understand his method is by following his 
practice”(p. 48).  Perhaps, this makes Harvey interested to develop spatiotemporal dialectic as 
more like an improvement upon than a negation of Marx’s dialectic though he argues that an 
“[e]scape from the teleologies of Hegel and Marx can … most readily be achieved by appeal to 
the particularities of spatiality (network, levels, connections)” (Harvey, 1996, 109).  
In an essay titled “The Dialectics of Spacetime”, David Harvey proposed two dimensions of 
the spatiotemporal dialectic: the first one consists of three definitions of space and time: 
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absolute, relative and relational. The second dimension, which he borrows from Henry 
Lefebvre, consists of another three different definitions: experienced, conceptualized, and lived.  
I will briefly explain each of the definitions of space and time, first within the first dimension:   
(a) Absolute: Absolute space refers to the realm of fixed and measurable place. 
Absolute time is also fixed, measurable and linear.  No two objects or persons can be 
exactly at the same space at any given time and that is how absolute space and time are 
“socially exclusionary” (p. 99).  
(b) Relative: Whereas absolute space and time are all about the realm of fixity, stasis, 
and determination, relative spacetime is “the spaces of process and motion” (p. 100) 
(emphasis original). Space, in the realm of relative, cannot be perceived in isolation from 
time. Harvey thus refers to this as space-time.  At this level, the boundary of absolute 
space and time conforms to the logic of indeterminacy and relativity. The concept of 
absolute time and place gets replaced by the idea of relative time and space. Individualist 
identity becomes relative and multiple identities.   
(c) Relational: In this realm, “space and time are internalized within matter and 
process” (p. 101). Space and time, in this realm, are not only simply correlational or 
simultaneous but also integrated and fused. Harvey wants to indicate this difference when 
he writes of relative “space-time” and relational “spacetime” differently, with different 
spelling.   
To focus on the second dimension, I will both explain it and examine micropolitics against 
the spatiotemporal dialectic developed by Harvey and Lefebvre.  
 
It is helpful to understand the spatial construction of our everyday realities as explained by  
Lefebvre in his book titled The Production of Space (1991). It is useful to outline Lefebvre’s 
phenomenological accession to the three dimensions of the production of space with the concepts 
of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived:  
 
I. Perceived space: space has a perceivable aspect that can be grasped by the senses. 
This perception constitutes an integral component of every social practice. It comprises 
everything that presents itself to the senses; not only seeing but hearing, smelling, 
touching, tasting. This sensuously perceptible aspect of space directly relates to the 
materiality of the “elements” that constitute “space.” 
II. Conceived space: space cannot be perceived as such without having been 
conceived in thought previously. Bringing together the elements to form a “whole”, that 
is, Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space presumes an act of thought that is linked 
to the production of knowledge. 
III. Lived space: the third dimension of the production of space is the lived 
experience of space. This dimension denotes the world as it is experienced by human 
beings in the practice of their everyday life.  
 
Interestingly, both Certeau’s tactic and Scott’s infrapolitics emerge from their attempt at 
theorizing everyday life. But I argue that both Certeau and Scott could have benefitted from 
Lefebvre’s understanding of everyday life and social realties.  
Lefebvrian lived space maintains a dialectic between the realms of the perceived, the 
conceived, and the lived. This dialectic is, in fact, one of the continual making and remaking of 
the perceived, the conceived, and the lived. Lived space or Lefebvrian social realties must be 
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understood as such as individuals influence and get influenced by historical and material 
forces—not only by structures of power such as capitalism, patriarchy, imperialism, and so 
forth., but also by vectors of differences: race, class, sex, gender, ability, and so on. In contrast to 
Lefebvrian everyday realities, what Certeau and Scott provide as lived realities appear as static 
and exclusionary. They are static because Lefebvrian perceived space and conceived space in 
them are taken as non-susceptible to changes: the farmers and the poor would never conceive 
relative identities, and, thereby, acts of resistance beyond their secluded practices of concealed 
protests. Within the projects of Certeau and Scott, it is also impossible to recognize multiple 
roles of domination and subordination individuals carry on. They instead foreground the binary 
configurations of the powerful and the powerless but leave out what kind of interactions may 
happen within and across the marginalized. Hence, Colin Barker critiques Scott’s idea of a 
‘hidden transcript’ among the powerless as Barker argues, “Scott, in bending the theoretical stick 
against theories of the ‘dominant ideology’, risks treating the world of the hidden transcript as 
marked by simple unity and harmonious amity among the oppressed (17).”  
The paper, at this point, undertakes a double-move: a theoretical exposure of the inefficacy of 
individualistic infrapolitics, and an attempt to spatialize infrapolitics to get it integrated into an 
emerging mode of macro- narrative as exemplified in the function of WikiLeaks and some other 
social movements grounded in collective infrapolitics.  
First, I would like to show how infrapolitics—however self-celebratory it is—tends to be  
merely hurling  a few stones—verbal or otherwise—of protest, gestures not even necessarily 
meant to elicit a direct response, over the thick wall said to separate the populace from the 
politicians. The proponents of such gestures seem to believe that the postmodern infatuation with 
mere symbolism of performance will suffice. But the politically empty nature of infrapolitics can 
be shown using the insights of the theory of space by Lefebvre.  It can be argued that neither 
Scott’s infrapolitics nor Certeau’s tactic is grounded in a proper understanding of the elements of 
“order” and “chaos” in the spatial. What Certeau considers “chaotic” or revolutionary in tactic is, 
in fact, a mere whimsical continuation, an extension or a passive following of the same order of 
the spatial. To substantiate the argument, let us remind ourselves of Certeau’s tactic again. To 
begin with, Certeau argues that 
 
tactics are procedures that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to 
time--to the circumstances which the precise instant of an intervention transforms 
into a favorable situation, to the rapidity of the movements that change the 
organization of a space, to the relations among successive moments in an action, to 
the possible intersections of durations and heterogeneous rhythms, etc. (p. 38) 
 
In this definition, the transformation of a strategic arrangement into a “favorable situation” is 
no transformation at all, as it is too much dependent on two things: an uncertain wait for a fissure 
in the spatial configuration of a system and the innovative use of the imagination by an 
individual who would be applying the tactic. Furthermore, a successful application of the tactic 
may offer a temporary escape route, or a short-term relief, but one cannot expect any qualitative 
change in the system against which one is set to fight in the first place. The denial of this change 
emerges from the separation of the individual from the social construction of space and also from 
an inadequate understanding of the spatial construction of society.  
The second allegation against tactic can be perceived from Massey’s discussion of “chaos”, 
and “order” in the spatial. Massey argues that 




The spatial form was socially ‘planned’, in itself directly socially caused, that 
way. But there is also an   element of ‘chaos’ which is intrinsic to the spatial. For 
although the location of each (or a set) of a number of phenomena may be directly 
caused (we know why X is here and Y is there), the spatial positioning of one in 
relation to the other (X’s location in relation to Y) may not be directly caused 
[…]. Thus, the chaos of the spatial results from dire happenstances juxtapositions, 
the accidental separations, the often paradoxical nature of the spatial arrangement 
that result from the operation of all these causalities (Massey: 303).    
 
The operation of causalities is the process which authorities use to manufacture consent to 
maintain and reinforce Gramscian hegemony, a pervasive influence of structures of power within 
which individuals must situate themselves. While Gramsci wants individuals to form counter- 
power or counter-hegemony, Certeau’s tactic attempts to adjust itself to instead of questioning 
this operation of causalities or hegemony.  Overall, Certeau’s tactic does not show any interest in 
the epistemology of the “chaos” (Massey), an integral constituent of hegemony which seeks to 
unsettle the remainder of the hegemony. Chaos is that potential factor of insurgency which may 
expose the tyrannical nature of the overpowering order, reasons, or causalities at work in an 
existing hegemonic formation. The function of the chaos, an exposure of the tyranny of the 
hegemonic logics and of the order, of the hegemonic logics (?) themselves can be conceptualized 
within Lefebvrian understanding of social realties, within constant making and remaking of the 
perceived, the conceived and the lived, as explained above. Therefore, we might conclude that 
the spatializing of tactic implies a radical reconceptualization of Certeau’s project of resistance 
along the line of counter-hegemonic struggles.  
To elucidate the spatialization of infrapolitics, I would like to argue that WikiLeaks has 
created windows for the surplus of the lived space (Lefebvre) to “see” and develop a concrete 
understanding of the remainder of the hegemony, the constant renewal of the consent of the 
people, on which the appropriating systems, i.e., the state, the society, and so forth heavily rely. 
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Figure1.1: The Production of Space 
 
The concept surplus of the lived space is developed by Lefebvre to refer to the realm of the 
inexpressible, the remainder, and the  which cannot be exhausted by theoretical analysis. The 
surplus has a particular spatiotemporal relationship with the dialectic of the perceived-
conceived-lived space, but it is easier to identify it as a temporal sequence, a result of reflection 
on the dialectic,+ as if the surplus comes after reflection. But the surplus is a constant or 
interactive aspect of the triad. Lefebvre argues that the surplus can be perceived by all but can 
only be communicated in and through artistic expressions. This surplus has subversive potential, 
but it often gets appropriated by the hegemony. In other words, this surplus is a perpetual prey to 
the renewal of the hegemony. As Gramsci explain in his Selections from the Prison Notebooks 
(1917), hegemony is a pervasive ideological domination of the powerful class, domination not by 
force but by consent. The objective of hegemony is producing those versions of reality that 
people eventually accept as “common sense”, as “the general sense, feeling or judgment of 
mankind, more precisely, as the cluster of beliefs felt to be true by most people (Salamini: 83).”    
In other words, the surplus is made victim to the constant attempts on the part of the 
hegemonic forces to renew, energize, and reinforce the manufacturing of consent. The 
hegemonic forces (mis)guide the surplus in the sense that they make sure that the surplus does 
not become threatening for, let alone antagonistic or hostile to them. In order to (mis)guide or 
misappropriate the surplus, the hegemonic forces are in a constant manufacturing of consent to 
the authoritative forces in the society. This particular aspect of hegemony, which attempts to 
achieve reproduction of renewal of consent, is what I like to call remainder of the hegemony.  
WikiLeaks opens windows for all to see concretely the (mis)guidance of the surplus by 
hegemony. “They know it but they are doing it anyway” becomes undeniable to even to the 
hegemonic forces themselves (Žižek: 30). This new and concrete knowing destabilizes the 
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causalities or order within a tyrannical system. In other worlds, it inspires chaos or insurgence by 
delegitimizing consent within the hegemonic system. It may also be used for coalition building 
across vectors of differences: race, class, sex, gender, ability, and so on. Thus, it may lead to 
counter-hegemonic struggle or activisms in an attempt to move from the war of position towards 
the war of maneuver, the war of position and the war of maneuvering being Gramscian phases 
on a continuum in which the first phase or the war of position refers to “a prolonged struggle for 
the adherence of the general population and the achievement of political power, generally 
without insurrection of armed struggle (Omi and Winant: 143)”. Coalition building within and 
across multiple vectors of difference should occur within the war of position. But this phase is 
not the end point since it would gradually usher in the war of maneuver, “ historical stage where 
everything is condensed into one front in one strategic moment of struggle for the purpose of 
opening a single victorious breach in the enemy’s defense (Ling : 12).” It is helpful to notice that 
the war of position is a struggle across different fronts in the society so that these different fronts 
can gradually get organized as one front and execute the war of maneuver, the violent overthrow 
of the tyrannical system in order to construct a just one.  
 WikiLeaks, as Julian Assange says, cannot make the revolution for people; it can inspire 
one. So, the function of WikiLeaks can be shown in the following diagram:  
 
                                              Figure 1.2 (a): The Function of WikiLeaks 
 
The “W” stands for WikiLeaks and the upper arrow shows a one way direction from the 
“surplus of lived space” towards the “remainder of the hegemony”, meaning the lived space’s 
accommodation of a concrete understanding given by the latter. The letter “M” above the second 
arrow means social movement while the arrow itself indicates a two way process indicating that 
mere understanding will not be enough; people should initiate counter-hegemonic struggles. The 
world requires the involvement of the masses and spatial infrapolitics beautifully embraces this 
spirit of involvement. Assange’s interpretation of the function of WikiLeaks reflects this 
theoretical frame. He believes that WikiLeaks unveils the pretentious claims of the liberal 
ideologues by creating a situation which they are unable to deny (Brevini et.al: 66). This is what 
I would like to call the movement of the surplus of the lived space towards the remainder of the 
hegemony. 
Badiou marks the uprisings in the 21st century as riots: immediate, latent, and historical. 
Immediate riot is immediate unrest protesting violence of the state. It is often the preliminary 
form of historical riot. It is participated in by a segment of the population. It is spearheaded by  
youth, often in clashes with the police. Immediate riot is full of tactical innovations: use of 
Facebook, Twitter, and other technologies for communication helps in forming quick assemblies.  
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Also, fire, drums, leaflets, temporary retreat through backstreets, slogans, the ringing of bells 
makes the assembly gradually bigger and lively.  Despite use of innovative tactics, immediate 
riots have “inadequacies in discipline, strategic tenacity and moderation, when required, […] 
(Badiou: 22-23).” The inadequate strategy is perceived when the immediate riot hardly gets 
extended beyond the original site of assembly. Like a blind force, it smashes things on its way 
and around it but cannot go beyond the level of weak localization. It fails to get people at 
different intersections involved. It fails to articulate any “universalizable intention” (Badiou: 23) 
beyond immediate rage and dissent. With   strategic moderation, however, an immediate riot can 
pave the way for a historical riot.  
Latent riots manifest quasi-riotous features: they tend to go beyond distinctive group 
belonging. One example of this is proxy strikes in which wage-earners go on strike, though they 
do not stop working. In fact, it is almost impossible for workers to stop work and go unpaid. So, 
people who do not work in that given factory or other establishment come up with an assembly, 
occupation, or strike with the agreement of the actual workers. What makes this riot unique is “a 
shared localization” (Badiou: 30), unlike the limited localization of the immediate riot.  
A historical riot is “the transformation of an immediate riot” (Badiou: 33).  Unlike the 
immediate riot, it does not extend by imitation but by qualitative extension. One sign of this 
extension is participation of people from all sectors: students, workers, intellectuals, family 
members, women, employees, civil servants, and even some police officers and soldiers, among 
others. Badiou argues: “a riot becomes historical when its localization ceases to be limited, but 
grounds in the occupied space the promise of a new temporality; when its composition stops 
being uniform, but gradually outlines a unified representation in mosaic forms of all the people; 
when, finally, the negative growling of pure rebellion is succeeded by the assertion of a shared 
demand, whose satisfaction confers an initial meaning of the word ‘victory’ (Badiou: 35).”    
For Badiou, only the historical riot can end an intervallic period—a time when revolutionary 
ideas remain dormant—and pave the way for qualitatively different kind of organized politics. 
Badiou believes that Western World has not seen a historical riot in four decades. Therefore, the  
intervallic periodof neoliberal capitalist control, the period from the  1980s to today,  continues.  
I would argue that Badiou’s historical riot occur within Harvey’s dialectical tension between 
absolute space, relative space and the relational space. Immediate riot occurs in Harvey’s 
absolute space:  
 
“[…] an immediate riot is located in the territory of those who take part in it. 
[…] An immediate riot, stagnating in its own social space, is not a powerful 
subjective trajectory. […] That is not to say that an immediate riot stops at one 
particular site. […] [a]n immediate riot spreads not by displacement, but by 
imitation (Badiou, 23-24).   
 
Spreading of immediate riot towards other cities, however, does not contribute to “qualitative 
extension” (Badiou: 34) which is required to bring forth the historical riot. Latent riot is also 
limited in demanding qualitative changes. Consequentially, both latent and immediate riot do not 
go beyond Harvey's absolute and the relative spaces whereas historical riot can occur only within 
the dialectical tension between the absolute, the relative, and the relational. The entire process 
can be shown in a flow chart (see appendix).  It is obvious that Badiou would accept the Marxian 
dialectic. Badiou analyses contemporary uprisings in historicist and materialist terms. He even 
considers these uprising as a repetition of history with a demand for more qualitative changes. 
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For him, the global popular rising “naturally resembles the first working class insurrections of 
the nineteenth century” (Badiou: 5). However, I believe that the dialectic of social movements 
for Badiou, as explained above, is more like the dialectic of Harvey than of Marx.  
Micropolitics is individualistic or hyper-personalized. As individualistic, it remains trapped 
within the level of personal anguish of the “lived space” (Lefebvre). Though it is often argued 
that this personal anguish has a subversive potential, that subversive potential—within the scope 
of micropolitics at least—often gets appropriated by the “remainder of hegemony”. Scott and 
Certeau would argue for the collective dimension of micropolitics, offering their finding that 
many individuals together build a culture of resistance against systemic manipulation. For Scott, 
the poor peasants in Malaysia, for Chatterjee6, the poor slum dwellers in Kolkata, and for 
Certeau, the consumers as activists in the metropolis, for example, offer a collective insurrection 
against the manipulative systems of power: the landlords, the nation-state agencies, and the 
corporate capitalist forces. However, this micropolitical collective at best remains 
“mechanistically” collective. By mechanistically collective, I refer to Scott’s peasants, for 
example, who practice subterranean, collectively unconscious, and decidedly concealed practices 
of insurrection—which are identified and subsequently theorized as “hidden transcript” by James 
C. Scott. I have concerns regarding this “collective form of micropolitics as resistance” as it is 
routinely endorsed by the proponents and the followers of micropolitics. First, it remains within a 
kind of horizontal affinity-building effort, not ambitious enough to cross boundaries of class, 
group, caste, and other intersectional vectors. Consequentially, it replicates the logic and danger 
of the division of labor embedded in the capitalist mode of production.  
But the very claims of going beyond “the realm of the personal” and “becoming collective” 
needs to be examined to understand the very nature and scope of the collective solidarity. To 
begin with, the collective in micropolitics is devoid of any organic orchestration of agency, as 
this sort of collective does not emerge or evolve from any urge to move towards the dance of 
dialectic7. I will explain the dance of the dialectic below, but first, I will explain diving and 
dissent.  
It is helpful to recognize different modes of resistance within Harvey’s understanding of the 
dialectic between absolute space, relative space, and relational space. With the neoliberal 
capitalistic management of differences, individuals as “vulnerable constructs of biopower” are 
encouraged to compromise with all forms of systemic manipulation. This is the only mode of 
survival and progress offered by neoliberal capitalistic forces. We can call it “diving” into the 
system. Bhabha’s mimicry and hybridity, for example, are ways of making compromise through 
which diasporic communities in the metropolis get integrated with the manipulative system. No 
collective efforts are necessary. Individuals can attempt this “diving” and come out as successful.  
The micropolitical collective or organizing, unless spatialized, remains at the level of 
“dissent” towards systemic manipulation but hesitant and incapable of radically challenging, 
attacking, and transforming the system itself. The urge to transform as opposed to the urge to 
survive through compromise can be felt only with an understanding of the dance of the dialectic 
which in turn is based on the understanding of the dialectic between absolute space, relative 
space and relational space. I will explain the dance of the dialectic at this point.  
At the absolute level, we tend to think ‘present’ disconnected form past and future. Worse, 
we prefer to be ignorant of other aspects of space and time: the relative and the relational. But we 
need to recognize the dialectic between all three dimensions of space and time. Their relations 
are not hierarchical but they are in perpetual overlapping or in a constant tension.  Spatial 
micropolitics (as in Johnson and Smith) have the potential to usher in the spatiotemporal 
Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum, Vol 6, Issue 1 
22 
	  
dialectic in our political imagination.  Fragmented and fetishized micropolitics, however, prefers 
to remain in the absolute (as in Scott and Certeau) and the relative (as in Bhabha) only. A dance 
of the dialectic in this context would mean mobilizing resistance along the dimensions of the 
spatiotemporal dialectic towards revolution. In the context of our examples, it would mean 
mobilizing ‘spatial micropolitics’ towards Badiou’s ‘historical riot’.  
The figure below gives an overview of my description of micropolitics herein. 
 
Scott and Certeau 
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Collectivity is not 
necessarily 
required 
Figure 1.2 (b): An Overview of Micropolitics As Described Herein 
 
I consider all micropolitics charted above inadequate in the sense that they are indifferent to 
the spatiotemporal dialectic. Scott and Certeau decidedly limit their politics within the absolute. 
If their infrapolitics or tactics have any sense of collectivity, it is taken as natural as alliance of 
the oppressed which is more of a byproduct or symptom of the systemic oppression. It is more 
escapist and non-resisting than dissenting or confrontational. Bhabha’s mimicry and sly civility, 
in contrast, are simply adaptive. They consider merging with the manipulative power structures 
as a mode of avoiding the manipulation itself.  
 Situating macropolitics and micropolitics in a binary configuration as Deleuze and Guattari 
do is problematic as it is argued, “politics is simultaneously macropolitics and micropolitics 
(1987: 213).” But, while they emphasize simultaneity, Harvey and Lefebvre see a dialectic 
between the micropolitical and the macropolitical.   
Deleuze reads dialectic as synthesis of contradictions or differences. To him, dialectic 
attempts to establish higher unity among diverse forces in social realities. Deleuze hence says, 
“What I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the Dialectic (Deleuze: 112). It 
does not want to synthesize anything but emphasizes constant becoming or unbecoming, which 
is also objective of their project. Deleuze considers desire as free-floating will power seeking to 
establish fragmented and random connection with material realities. Spatiotemporal dialectic 
recognizes this fragmented and random connectivity, but only in its absolute and relative 
aspects, and in the relational aspect the dynamic between the absolute, the relative, and the 
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relational becomes obvious. So, the spatiotemporal dialectic, with all of its integral aspects, 
reveals a constant interplay between stasis and dynamism.  
 Foucault and Deleuze imagine “dive” as “dance”. Deleuze emphasizes the molecular 
operation of desire and will-power as revolutionary as he says: “no revolution ever takes place 
without the investment of desire (Holland: 103).”  Thus he finds the micro or the molecular as 
subversive. He also subordinates the macro or the molar to the micro or the molecular. Foucault, 
on the other hand, promotes the technology of the self as revolutionary: “Foucault saw 
individuals as self-determining agents capable of challenging and resisting the structure of 
domination (Besley: 21)”. Thus Deleuze and Foucault conceptualize counter-power and desire 
in the realms of the absolute and relative. They carry a kind of phobia about the relational as it 
would mean stasis and fascism for them. Hence neither Foucault nor Deleuze and Guattari can 
go beyond the project of personal growth and development and present any consistent politics 
of the social: “whereas Foucault failed to account for the legitimacy of radical politics, Deleuze 
and Guattari have no theory of why revolutionary desire is preferable over fascist desire (Best 
and Kellner:108).” Overall, it can be argued: micropolitics as proposed by Scott, Certeau, 
Bhabha, Foucault, and Deleuze builds on the absolute and relative spaces but carefully avoids 
relational space.  
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The flow chart shows how the project of spatialized micropolitics considers revolution as a 
process. It is an extension of figure 1.1 and 1.2 to and explains how the surplus of the lived space 
can follow different paths occurring as dive, dissent, and dance. Whereas immediate and latent 
riots are manifestations of dissent, it requires historical riot, through a dance of the dialectic to 
make radical transformation of a given system.  
 
